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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tyson E. Madden appeals from his judgment of conviction for eluding a police 
officer and DUI. Mr. Madden pleaded guilty but preserved the right to appeal from the 
denial of his motion to dismiss the eluding charge. He asserts that the district court 
erred by denying his motion because he had already been prosecuted for the same 
offense in Washington. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedincls 
The facts of this case are undisputed. (Tr., p.4, ~s.21-24.)' On May 26, 2007, 
Mr. Madden stole a pickup truck in Coeur dlAlene. (Tr., p.6, Ls.2-9.) At a little before 
midnight, an officer observed him driving without headlights and attempted to stop him. 
(Tr., p.6, Ls.10-14.) Mr. Madden did not stop and a pursuit occurred, eventually leading 
to lnterstate 90. (Tr., p.6, Ls.18-20.) While on Interstate 90, Mr. Madden crossed into 
Washington. (Tr., p.6, Ls. 18-20.) 
An officer from the Liberty Lake, Washington Police Department was called to 
assist the ldaho officers. (Tr., p.6, Ls.20-21.) Mr. Madden crashed the truck in 
Washington. (Tr., p.6, Ls.22-23.) 
Mr. Madden was charged with, and he pleaded guilty to, possession of stolen 
property and attempted eluding in Washington. (R., p.72-90.) He was subsequently 
charged in ldaho with grand theft, eluding, and DUI. (R., p.41.) Mr. Madden filed a 
' Citations to the transcript in this brief are to the augmented transcript of the motion to 
dismiss and the entry of the guilty plea, held December 7, 2006, and December 15, 
2006. 
motion to dismiss the grand theft and eluding charges on the basis that he had already 
been prosecuted and pleaded guilty to those crimes in Washington. (R., p.54.) 
The district court granted the motion with regard to the grand theft charge. 
(Tr., p.16, Ls.20-21.) The motion was denied with respect to the eluding charge, 
however, with the district court making the following holding: 
The difficulty with the eluding allegation is is you have behavior that can 
occur separately and distinctly in each state. Now the state of Washington 
apparently holds violation of the felony in the state of Washington by 
running from law enforcement in the state of Washington in a reckless 
manner, which is similar to our statute. But the behavior is separate, 
independent and distinct in this court's estimation. When he stole the car 
and he had possession of the car, nothing changed when he crossed state 
lines. He had one singular crime that could be prosecuted essentially in 
either state. But there was nothing that required him to continue running 
from law enforcement in a reckless fashion in the state of Washington. 
And so there is a distinct act in the state of Washington where motoring 
members of the public were jeopardized by his reckless conduct in that 
particular state. And by not adhering to the directives of law enforcement 
in that particular state, I think, is a distinct and separate offense from his 
behavior on the roadways here in the state of ldaho. He had simply driven 
recklessly here in the state of Idaho, crossed state lines and then slowly 
and calmly and still not pulled over for law enforcement, it would be two 
separate and distinct crimes as well. 
But I think there's a real distinction between the two offense that are in 
front of the court. And I don't feel satisfied that the provisions of 19-315 
are applicable to count 1 [eluding]. So I'm prepared to grant the motion to 
dismiss count 2 [grand theft] in this case. I'll deny the motion with respect 
to eluding a peace officer in count 1 .  
(Tr., p.15 - L.17 - p.16, L.22.) Mr. Madden subsequently entered into a conditional 
guilty plea in which he preserved the right to appeal from the denial of the motion to 
dismiss the eluding charge. (R., p.107.) This appeal followed. (R., p.126.) 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Madden's motion to dismiss the eluding charge 
where Mr. Madden had already pleaded guilty to eluding in Washington in a case 
involving the same conduct that is at issue in this case? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Madden's Motion To Dismiss The Eluding 
Charqe Because Mr. Madden Had Already Pleaded Guilty To Eludina In Washinclton In 
A Case lnvolvincl The Same Conduct That Is At lssue In This Case 
A. Introduction 
Because Mr. Madden pleaded guilty to eluding in Washington, he asserts that the 
district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the eluding charge in ldaho 
because it involves the same course of conduct. 
B. The District Court Erred Bv Denying Mr. Madden's Motion To Dismiss The 
Eludin~ Charge Because Mr. Madden Had Already Pleaded Guilty To Eludinq In 
Washington In A Case lnvolvina The Same Conduct That Is At lssue In This 
Case 
In Washington, Mr. Madden was charged with attempting to elude a police 
vehicle, which required proof that Mr. Madden, "in the State of Washington, on or about 
May 26, 2006, did willfully fail and refuse to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop and 
did drive his vehicle in a reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police 
vehicle after being given a visual or audible sign to bring the vehicle to a stop . . . ." 
(R., p.73.) In Idaho, it was alleged that, on May 26, 2006, in the County of Kootenai, 
Mr. Madden "willfully eluded andlor attempted to elude a police vehicle after being given 
a visual signal andlor audible signal to stop," that he drove his vehicle in excess of thirty 
miles per hour over the speed limit, andlor drove in a manner likely to endanger the 
property andlor person of another, andlor left the state of ldaho. (R., p.42.) There can 
be no dispute, therefore, that Mr. Madden's two charges stemmed from the same act of 
eluding ldaho and Washington officers on May 26, 2006. 
Mr. Madden's motion was based on I.C. § 19-315. It states, "[wlhen an act 
charged as a public offense, is within the venue of another state, territory, or country, as 
we// as of this state, a conviction or acquittal thereof in the former is a bar to the 
prosecution or indictment therefore in this state." I.C. 3 19-315 (emphasis added.) By 
its own terms, the statute applies to a crime that occurs in ldaho as well as another 
state. There can be no dispute that the eluding that occurred in this case occurred in 
Washington as well as Idaho. Thus, under the terms of the statute, Mr. Madden's 
conviction for eluding in Washington serves as a bar to prosecution in ldaho because 
the act occurred in Washington as well as ldaho. 
This statute has been rarely interpreted in ldaho. It was addressed recently, 
however, by the Court of Appeals. See Cook v. State, 145 ldaho 482, 180 P.3d 521 
(Ct. App. 2008.) In Cook, the petitioner raised a claim that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss on the basis that he had already been 
subject to the same charges in federal and Utah prosecutions. Id. at 491, 180 P.3d at 
530. The district court found that none of the crimes Mr. Cook pleaded guilty to in ldaho 
were covered by the other prosecutions. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that "the 
key question is whether Cook was actually charged with a crime in federal court for his 
actions in ldaho." Id. The Court further stated, "passing references to his activities in 
ldaho would not be sufficient to indict him for his illegal acts there" and, further, there 
was "no reason to believe that the indictment was meant to cover the scheme in regard 
to ldaho victims where it carefully laid out each count, complete with the names and 
residences of the victims, and there was no such care taken in regard go the ldaho 
acts." Id. Therefore, the court concluded, "Cook was indicted in federal court only for 
the portion of his activities which victimized Wyoming citizens." Id. 
The facts of this case are very different. Mr. Madden was convicted in 
Washington for a crime that began in ldaho and was indisputably the same course of 
conduct that occurred on May 26, 2006. Unlike the Cook case, where the petitioner 
was charged with multiple acts occurring in multiple states, Mr. Madden's actions 
cannot be individually split - all that happened in this case is that, during the chase, 
Mr. Madden happen to cross the state line and a Washington officer joined the pursuit. 
Mr. Madden's crime occurred in Washington as well as ldaho, and therefore, 1.C. § 19- 
315 clearly applies. 
Further, the district court's rationale is incorrect. The district court held that there 
was a "distinct act" in Washington that endangered the motorists of that state. 
(Tr., p.16, Ls.5-8.) Because, the court concluded, that Mr. Madden eluded officers in 
both Washington and ldaho, he could be charged in both Washington and ldaho. The 
fault in this rationale is that it overlooks the language of section 19-315, which prohibits 
double prosecutions for crimes that occur in two states. While the crime of eluding 
carried over to Washington, the crime was still being committed in ldaho as well as 
Washington, and I.C. 3 19-315 still applies. 
Finally, to the extent that this Court considers the meaning of section 19-315 to 
unclear, ldaho has adopted the rule of lenity in interpreting criminal statutes, holding 
that "criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of defendants." State v. 
Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 859 P.2d 1387 (1993). Thus, to the extent this Court finds 
I.C. § 19-315 to be ambiguous, this statute must be strictly construed in favor of 
Mr. Madden to prohibit a prosecution for the crime of eluding that occurred in Idaho as 
well as Washington. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Madden requests that his conviction for eluding be dismissed. 
DATED this 25'h day of September, 2008. 
Deputy state Appellate F%blic Defender 
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